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The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was a 1964 congressional measure that authorized President Lyndon B. Johnson to use military force in Southeast Asia without a formal declaration of war. More Less
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Mar 1956
North Vietnamese leadership approved tentative measures to revive the southern insurgency by December 1956, laying groundwork for renewed communist resistance against the government of South Vietnam.
Apr 1957
A communist-led uprising began against the government of South Vietnamese president Ngo Dinh Diem, marking a significant escalation of the insurgency.
Image source: Ngo Dinh Diem
Jan 1959
The North Vietnamese Communist Party approved a people’s war against South Vietnam. On July 28, North Vietnamese forces also invaded Laos to maintain and upgrade the Ho Chi Minh trail.
Image source: Vietnam War
Sep 1960
COSVN, North Vietnam’s southern headquarters, ordered a full-scale coordinated Viet Cong uprising. Soon, about one-third of South Vietnam’s population lived in areas under communist control.
Image source: Viet Cong
1961 - 1963
About 40,000 communist soldiers infiltrated from North Vietnam into South Vietnam during this period, strengthening the insurgency and increasing pressure on the South Vietnamese government.
Image source: Ho Chi Minh trail
Nov 2, 1963
Ngo Dinh Diem was overthrown and killed in a CIA-supported coup, intensifying political instability in South Vietnam and deepening U.S. concerns about the war.
Image source: 1963 South Vietnamese coup d'état
Jan 30, 1964
General Nguyen Khanh overthrew General Duong Van Minh in another Saigon coup, further demonstrating the instability of South Vietnam’s political leadership.
1961 - 1963
The CIA trained South Vietnamese volunteers and infiltrated them into North Vietnam to launch an anti-communist guerrilla war. The effort failed badly; all 80 teams infiltrated in 1963 were captured.
Image source: Central Intelligence Agency
1962
After visiting South Vietnam, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield became deeply disillusioned with its regime and skeptical of using American forces, concluding that the government was as tyrannical as the Viet Cong.
Image source: Mike Mansfield
1963
Johnson was motivated not only by the domino theory but also by fear that losing South Vietnam would provoke a right-wing backlash comparable to the reaction to the alleged loss of China in 1949.
Image source: Lyndon B. Johnson
1963
Throughout 1963, President John F. Kennedy’s administration became increasingly concerned that South Vietnam was losing its war against the North Vietnamese-directed Viet Cong.
Image source: John F. Kennedy
Dec 19, 1963
After visiting Saigon, Defense Secretary Robert McNamara told President Lyndon B. Johnson that the situation was very disturbing. He reported that the Viet Cong controlled more territory and population than expected and criticized the South Vietnamese military junta as indecisive and ineffective.
Image source: Robert McNamara
Dec 24, 1963
At a Christmas Eve party, Johnson told General Maxwell Taylor and other chiefs of staff, “Just let me get elected, and then you can have your war,” reflecting his political caution and private commitment to continuing the Vietnam effort.
Jan 1964
Johnson approved a plan to increase the pace and intensity of covert operations against North Vietnam, code-named Operation 34A.
1964
Johnson remembered that the approach of U.S. forces toward the Yalu River had prompted Chinese intervention in the Korean War. He feared invading North Vietnam could produce a similar response, especially because China now possessed nuclear weapons.
Feb 1964
Walt Whitman Rostow warned that committing American forces to Vietnam posed a constitutional problem because the U.S. Constitution assigned Congress the power to declare war.
Image source: Walt Rostow
Feb 1964
American Vietnam experts generally concluded that, without a major improvement in the South Vietnamese government and armed forces, South Vietnam had only an even chance of surviving the insurgency for the next few months.
Feb 1964
CIA Inspector General Lyman Kirkpatrick visited South Vietnam and reported that he was shocked by the number of American and military personnel who believed the tide was turning against the United States.
Mar 1, 1964
Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy advised Johnson that the United States should blockade Haiphong and bomb North Vietnamese railroads, factories, roads, and training camps. He cited the 1955 Formosa Resolution as a possible legal model.
Image source: William Bundy
Mar 8, 1964 - Mar 12, 1964
McNamara visited South Vietnam for four days and returned to Washington more pessimistic than before about the country’s military and political prospects.
Apr 1964
Senator Wayne Morse called the conflict “McNamara’s War” and argued that the United States was fighting an illegal and unwise war in Vietnam.
Image source: Wayne Morse
May 1964 - Jun 1964
William Bundy completed a rough draft of a resolution that would give Johnson broad authority to use force to defend nations in Southeast Asia threatened by communist aggression or subversion. The final draft was completed by early June.
Image source: Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
May 27, 1964
Johnson met and secretly recorded a discussion with Senator Richard Russell Jr. He noted doubts about Chinese intervention and observed that most Americans knew little about Vietnam despite the deaths of U.S. advisers.
Image source: Richard Russell Jr.
Jun 1964
The American ambassador in Saigon, Henry Cabot Lodge, resigned to seek the Republican presidential nomination.
Image source: Henry Cabot Lodge Jr.
Jun 15, 1964
National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy told the National Security Council that attacks on the South Vietnamese government were insufficient justification for the resolution. He argued that Congress would be more likely to act after an attack on American forces.
Image source: McGeorge Bundy
Jun 18, 1964
Canadian diplomat J. Blair Seaborn arrived in Hanoi carrying Johnson’s warning that North Vietnam would suffer the greatest devastation from American bombing if it continued its current course.
Image source: J. Blair Seaborn
Aug 5, 1964
Johnson asked his longtime friend Senator J. William Fulbright to use his influence to obtain passage of the resolution.
Image source: J. William Fulbright
Aug 6, 1964
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara testified before a joint session of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees about the Gulf of Tonkin events and the administration’s proposed response.
Aug 6, 1964
Wayne Morse spoke before an almost empty Senate and argued that the controversy should be settled around a conference table rather than on the battlefield.
Aug 6, 1964
Fulbright called for passage, accusing North Vietnam of aggression and praising Johnson’s restraint in responding to what he described as provocation by a small power.
Aug 11, 1964
William Bundy wrote a memorandum warning that unless South Vietnamese morale and momentum improved, General Nguyen Khanh’s regime could collapse.
Sep 1964
The Joint Chiefs of Staff war game Sigma II concluded that the United States would need roughly half a million troops to have a chance of victory and that strategic bombing alone would not decide the war.
Sep 7, 1964
Johnson convened a White House meeting with senior defense, diplomatic, intelligence, and military officials to discuss the next steps in Vietnam.
1964 - Jul 1964
Soviet workers built and installed radar stations and surface-to-air missile batteries across North Vietnam while training North Vietnamese personnel in their use.
Image source: Vietnam Air Defence - Air Force
Feb 1, 1964
South Vietnamese commandos began maritime raids against coastal North Vietnam under American naval operational command as part of Operation 34A.
Jul 30, 1964
South Vietnamese commandos attempted to attack a North Vietnamese radar station on Hon Me island. They were detected before landing, and North Vietnamese forces opened fire.
Image source: Gulf of Tonkin incident
Aug 2, 1964
USS Maddox, conducting a DESOTO patrol in the Gulf of Tonkin, reported being attacked by three North Vietnamese Navy torpedo boats. Maddox fired more than 280 five-inch shells, while the boats launched six torpedoes, all of which missed.
Aug 3, 1964
South Vietnamese Swift boats raided Cape Vinhson and Cua Ron as tensions continued along the North Vietnamese coast.
Aug 4, 1964
During a stormy night, USS Maddox and USS Turner Joy reported that North Vietnamese torpedo boats were attacking. Turner Joy fired approximately 220 shells at radar contacts, although later evidence cast doubt on whether enemy vessels were present.
Aug 4, 1964
Johnson told several congressmen that North Vietnam had attacked an American patrol in international waters and promised retaliation, helping create the political conditions for congressional action.
Aug 5, 1964
Johnson submitted the resolution to Congress. It would authorize him to take all necessary measures, including force, to prevent further aggression and protect peace and security in Southeast Asia.
Aug 10, 1964
The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution was enacted as Public Law 88-408. It became the principal congressional authorization cited for the major expansion of U.S. military involvement in Vietnam.
Aug 10, 1964
After less than nine hours of committee consideration and floor debate, Congress passed the joint resolution authorizing the president to take all necessary steps, including armed force, to assist members or protocol states of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.
Aug 13, 1964
J. Blair Seaborn arrived in Hanoi to meet North Vietnamese Premier Pham Van Dong, continuing diplomatic communications amid the escalation.
Nov 1, 1964
Viet Cong guerrillas attacked Bien Hoa Air Base, killing five American servicemen and destroying six B-57 bombers.
Image source: Bien Hoa Air Base
Dec 1, 1964
McNamara, Rusk, and McGeorge Bundy presented Johnson with three policy options, using what became known as the Goldilocks Principle. The extreme choices were invasion of North Vietnam or abandonment of South Vietnam.
Dec 24, 1964
The Viet Cong bombed the Brinks Hotel in Saigon, killing two Americans and further intensifying pressure on the Johnson administration.
Image source: 1964 Brinks Hotel bombing
Jan 1965
A memorandum by McGeorge Bundy and McNamara stated that the existing policy could lead only to disastrous defeat. It presented withdrawal or committing American forces to war as the remaining alternatives.
Feb 7, 1965
After a Viet Cong attack on the American base at Pleiku, Johnson ordered Operation Flaming Dart, a bombing raid against a North Vietnamese Army base and the beginning of increasingly intense air operations.
Feb 22, 1965
General William Westmoreland said he did not trust the Army of the Republic of Vietnam to protect the American air base at Danang and requested two Marine battalions. Johnson approved the request.
Image source: Operation Starlite
Mar 2, 1965
Johnson ordered Operation Rolling Thunder, the sustained strategic bombing campaign against North Vietnam that senior advisers had long urged.
Image source: Operation Rolling Thunder
Mar 8, 1965
Two battalions of U.S. Marines landed at Danang to protect the air base, marking the beginning of the large-scale deployment of American ground troops.
Apr 1, 1965
Johnson agreed to send two additional Marine battalions and 28,000 logistical troops after the Joint Chiefs recommended expanding the American commitment.
Apr 20, 1965
Johnson approved a plan to send 40,000 U.S. Army troops to South Vietnam by June, transforming the conflict into a major American ground war.
Jul 28, 1965
Johnson addressed the nation on television and announced that he had asked General Westmoreland what additional forces were needed to meet the mounting aggression, defending continued escalation.
Feb 1966
Senator Wayne Morse introduced a motion to repeal the resolution, arguing that it was unconstitutional and had been used beyond the limited purpose Johnson had promised.
1967
As the U.S. involvement became increasingly costly, the administration’s justification for the war and its use of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution came under growing scrutiny.
Jan 1969
The administration of President Richard Nixon initially opposed repeal, warning that repeal would have consequences for Southeast Asia beyond the Vietnam War.
Image source: Richard Nixon
1970
The Nixon administration began arguing that U.S. operations in Southeast Asia rested not on the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution but on the president’s constitutional authority as commander in chief to protect American troops during their withdrawal.
Jan 1971
Mounting public opposition to the war led Congress to attach repeal of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution to the Foreign Military Sales Act, which Nixon signed in January 1971.
1973
Congress passed the War Powers Resolution to restore limits on presidential authority to engage U.S. forces without a formal declaration of war. Nixon vetoed it, but Congress overrode the veto.
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