Tet Offensive Timeline

At an address at the National Press Club on 21 November, Westmoreland reported that, as of the end of 1967, the communists were "unable to mount a major offensive ... I am absolutely certain that whereas in 1965 the enemy was winning, today he is certainly losing...We have reached an important point when the end begins to come into view."

Although the decision had been made in December 1967 and Westmoreland was made Army Chief of Staff, many saw his relief as punishment for the entire Tet debacle.

Image source: William Westmoreland

During the second half of 1967, the administration had become alarmed by criticism, both inside and outside the government, and by reports of declining public support for its Vietnam policies. The question of whether the U.S. had made a mistake by sending troops to Vietnam had risen from 25 percent in 1965 to 45 percent by December 1967.

The Tet offensive would later be used in a textbook at West Point as an example of "an allied intelligence failure to rank with Pearl Harbor in 1941 or the Ardennes offensive in 1944." The name "Tet Offensive" usually refers to the January–February 1968 offensive, but can also be extended to cover all of the 21 weeks of intense combat after the initial attacks, including the "Mini-Tet" offensive in May and the Phase III offensive in August.

The optimistic assessments made before the offensive by the administration and the Pentagon came under heavy criticism and ridicule as the "credibility gap" that had opened in 1967 widened into a chasm.

By the end of 1967 the administration's approval rating had crept up by eight percent, but an early January Gallup poll indicated that forty-seven percent of the American public still disapproved of the President's handling of the war. Another January 1968 Gallup poll revealed 56 percent considered themselves hawks and 27 percent doves.

McNamara, the Secretary of Defense who had overseen the escalation of the war in 1964–1965, but who had eventually turned against it, stepped down from office.

Image source: Robert McNamara

Shortly before the 1968 United States presidential election, Republican candidate and former vice president Richard Nixon discouraged South Vietnamese president Nguyễn Văn Thiệu from cooperating in the negotiations, to cast doubt on Johnson's ability to bring peace.

One historian claims heavy losses inflicted on VC units struck into the heart of the infrastructure that had been built up for over a decade, claiming that 181,149 PAVN/VC troops had been killed during 1968. According to Max Hastings, the Tet Offensive, including the following "Mini-Tet" offensives in May and August of 1968, resulted in the deaths of 50,000 VC (total casualties drained 60–70% of their strength), while US forces lost 4,000 killed and ARVN 6,000 dead.

As a result of the heavy fighting, 1968 went on to become the deadliest year of the war for US forces with 16,592 soldiers killed. It was also the deadliest year for the ARVN, with 27,915 men killed.

The shocks that reverberated from the battlefield continued to widen: on 18 February 1968 MACV posted the highest U.S. casualty figures of the war to date.

According to the best estimates by MACV intelligence officers, the combined Viet Cong and PAVN forces in South Vietnam numbered 262,000 at the end of 1967. Expansion for the Tet Offensive increased the figure to 287,000 by the end of January 1968. They were able to find replacements for some but not all of the losses, and at the end of 1968, Viet Cong and PAVN forces had an estimated strength of 251,000. By late 1968, approximately 70% of the main force troops in the south were from North Vietnam.

By the end of 1968, one of every twelve South Vietnamese was living in a refugee camp.

In 1969, the year after the Tet battles, the US suffered 11,780 killed, the second highest annual total in the war.

One official Vietnamese publication states that by the end of 1969, very little communist-held territory ("liberated zones") was held. In 1969 only 1,700 new soldiers could be recruited in Region 5 (compared with 8,000 in 1968), and in the lowlands of Cochin China only 100 new soldiers (compared with 16,000 in 1968). However, the PAVN had little difficulty making up the casualties inflicted by the offensive.

During the first half of 1969, more than 20,000 PAVN/VC troops defected to allied forces, a threefold increase over the 1968 figure.

In line with the revamped strategy of Hanoi, on April 5, 1969, COSVN issued Directive 55 to all of its subordinate units: "Never again and under no circumstances are we going to risk our entire military force for just such an offensive."

Westmoreland was most concerned with the situation at Khe Sanh, where, on 21 January 1968, a force estimated at 20,000–40,000 PAVN troops had besieged the U.S. Marine base. During the entire battle from 1 November 1967 to 14 April 1968, 730 U.S. Marines were killed. Khe Sanh Base was later closed on 5 July 1968 because the base was seen as having less strategic importance than before.

In the aftermath of the recapture of the city, the discovery of several mass graves (the last of which were uncovered in 1970) of South Vietnamese citizens of Huế sparked a controversy that has not diminished with time.

Image source: Battle of Huế

On the morning of 2 March 1968, while patrolling 4 miles (6.4 km) north of Tan Son Nhut Air Base near the small village of Quoi Xuan to locate VC rocket sites, Company C, 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry Regiment walked into an ambush, losing 48 killed in eight minutes.

The North Vietnamese People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) and the Viet Cong (VC) launched a surprise attack on 30 and 31 January 1968 against the forces of the South Vietnamese Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN), the United States Armed Forces and their allies, targeting military and civilian command and control centers throughout South Vietnam. Phase I, scheduled to begin on 31 January, saw some attacks launched prematurely on 30 January, and was a countrywide assault on the cities, conducted primarily by VC forces.

The famous photograph, with the title Saigon Execution, won the 1969 Pulitzer Prize for Spot News Photography and is widely seen as a defining moment in the Vietnam War for its influence on U.S. public opinion.

Image source: Saigon Execution